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PROPERTY—FORECLOSURE; IS IT BY ENTRY OR FOR EASE OF ENTRY?
ISSUES OF FAIRNESS REGARDING THE MASSACHUSETTS FORECLOSURE
BY ENTRY PROVISION
INTRODUCTION
Imagine Mary, a thirty-six year-old widowed mother with five
small children, working three jobs to provide for her family. The young
mother is a homeowner and in a debtor/creditor relationship with a
lending bank. Mary does not make much income, but from what she
does make, most goes toward paying the mortgage on her home,
maintaining the house, and providing food and clothing for her children.
She is as hard working as they come and does nothing without putting
her children’s best interests first.
As the end of the year approaches, the cold weather really begins to
set in, and Mary worries about how she will afford the high cost of
heating her home in order to keep her children warm. At the same time,
she dreads the thought that the holidays are around the corner and knows
how heartbroken her children will be when they do not get all of the
expensive toys they so desperately asked for. What is just about the last
thing on her mind? Her mortgage.
However, Mary is a responsible homeowner and makes her last
monthly payment on the mortgage for the year. Although she
remembered to make the mortgage payment, the renewal notice for her
homeowners insurance got lost in the mail, and Mary never renewed the
policy. Insuring the building on the mortgaged property happens to be
one of the conditions of the mortgage agreement between Mary and the
lending institution. Consequently, she has unknowingly defaulted on a
condition of her mortgage. As the home is located in Massachusetts, the
lending institution decides that because it has been running into
problems foreclosing by power of sale,1 it will foreclose by open and
peaceable entry and continued possession.2 The lender has one of its
associates gather two witnesses and make an entry upon the property.
The entry happens to occur at 10:00 P.M., well after Mary has gone to
1. The term of art “foreclosure by power of sale” will be discussed in greater detail later
in the Note. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
2. “Foreclosure by open and peaceable entry and continued possession” will be
discussed in further detail later in the Note. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
91
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sleep. The three enter upon the mortgaged land in the dark of night,
wearing their entirely black suits. A certificate of entry is produced,
which the witnesses sign. Following the entry, the certificate is recorded
at the local registry of deeds. All of this happens without any process
actually informing Mary of these events.
Consequently, three years later, Mary receives a letter in the mail
informing her that a foreclosure by entry was initiated on her property,
and the three-year redemption period in which she had the opportunity to
redeem the property has ended. The letter further advises Mary that an
action for eviction will commence, and once the eviction is completed,
she will have thirty days to vacate the previously mortgaged land. This
does not seem to be a just administration of the law, nor does it appear to
promote fairness to a mortgaging homeowner. However, this is exactly
what could happen under Massachusetts law.3 Given the recent
foreclosure crisis, which affected mortgaging homeowners across the
United States, this provision seems to be unnecessarily burdensome on
homeowners.4
The Massachusetts foreclosure by entry statutory provision extends
as far back as the eighteenth century, if not further.5 Foreclosure by
entry was used frequently in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as
the primary method of foreclosure.6 Since then, its prevalence has
dwindled, and in recent years, this method has been used as a secondary
method of foreclosure.7 The provision seemingly had more significance
in the past when it was used in order to foreclose on mortgaged
properties that were abandoned or when the homeowner was absent for
long periods of time.8 A thorough analysis proves that the foreclosure
3. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1-2 (2012).
4. Subprime Mortgage Crisis, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1,
http://www.stat.unc.edu/faculty/cji/fys/2012/Subprime%20mortgage%20crisis.pdf (last
visited Mar. 23, 2015).
5. See Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 357, 359 (1851) (holding that “the leading purpose of
the open and peaceable entry, and the subsequent possession required by the statute of
1785 . . . [was] to give ample and full notice to the mortgagor.”). However, the foreclosure by
entry statute has not been at issue recently given the minimal cases dealing with it in recent
years.
6. See generally 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE §
69:16 (2013).
7. “The vast majority of foreclosures in Massachusetts involve both the sale method and
the entry method.” Id.
8. Most cases involving a dispute regarding a foreclosure by entry are from the
nineteenth century. See generally Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161 (1864); Lennon v. Porter, 71
Mass. 318 (1855); Bennett v. Conant, 64 Mass. 163, 167 (1852); Fay v. Valentine, 22 Mass.
418, 425 (1827); Skinner v. Brewer, 21 Mass. 468 (1827); Thayer v. Smith, 17 Mass. 429
(1821).
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by entry provision no longer holds the same worth in modern day
society, aside from the fact that it provides mortgagees with an unfair
advantage in the foreclosure process.9
The foreclosure by entry provision allows a lender to enter upon the
mortgaged premises in the presence of two witnesses who substantiate
the entry without alerting the homeowner of the entry and impending
foreclosure.10 After recording a certificate of entry in the local registry
of deeds, a three-year redemption period begins to run, during which the
mortgagor has the opportunity to redeem the property.11 Once the
redemption period ends, the mortgagor’s rights cease to exist.12 This
Note calls into question the effectiveness of this redemption period in
allowing homeowners to exercise their right to redeem the premises
when the homeowner is not aware of the ongoing foreclosure.
Furthermore, this Note argues that this method of foreclosure places
an undue burden on mortgagors faced with the process of foreclosure
and is unsettling in regards to public policy. The foreclosure by entry
provision in Massachusetts lacks clarity and direction in its
requirements, and the relevant case law does nothing to refine the
standards.13 This Note presents the concern that the foreclosure by entry
provision either needs to be revised legislatively or judicially and
9. The prevalence of cases involving foreclosure by entry related disputes are
significantly disproportionate from the nineteenth century to the twenty-first century, which
evidences the movement from using foreclosure by entry as a primary method of foreclosure
to using it as a secondary or back up method to foreclose by power of sale. See generally
cases cited supra note 8; HS Land Trust LLC v. Gonzalez, 2012 WL 5362885 (Mass. Land Ct.
Oct. 30, 2012); Singh v. 207-211 Main St., LLC, 937 N.E.2d 977 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010);
Pellegrini v. Silva, 876 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
10. “A mortgagee may, after breach of condition of a mortgage of land, recover
possession of the land mortgaged by an open and peaceable entry thereon, if not opposed by
the mortgagor or other person claiming it, or by action under this chapter . . . .” MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2004).
11. Id.
12. “[A]nd possession so obtained, if continued peaceably for three years from the date
of recording of the memorandum or certificate as provided in section two, shall forever
foreclose the right of redemption.” Id.
13. See e.g., HS Land Trust LLC, 2012 WL 5362885 (stating that the mortgagee’s
possession continues up until the mortgagor acts adverse to the mortgagee’s possession, but
gives no example of what an adverse action might include); Cunningham v. Davis, 56 N.E. 2
(Mass. 1900) (stating that in order to interrupt the possession of the mortgagee, the mortgagor
must act adversely to such possession; however, there is no discussion of what would
constitute an adverse act); Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36 (1873) (plaintiffs were found not
to have entered with force and violence when they used a crow bar to remove the window
fasteners, and defendant’s opposition to entry was found sufficient by throwing hot water at
the plaintiffs and hitting one with a stick, but no clear answer was given as to what would
constitute force and violence on the part of the mortgagee, or what would comprise an
insufficient opposition to an entry on the part of the mortgagor).
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additionally updated to include more modern standards. If revision is
not possible, the provision should be repealed in order to establish
fairness to all parties involved in the foreclosure process.
Section I of this Note explains what a foreclosure is, when it can be
instituted, the effect it has on the mortgage, and outlines the various
methods and types of foreclosure available. Part I.A details the nature of
a foreclosure by examining the mortgage process, discussing the theories
behind mortgage, and explaining the equity of redemption. Part I.B
describes the various methods of foreclosure available and the
requirements of each. Part I.C discusses the foreclosure crisis that the
United States experienced in 2007, the impact it had on homeowners,
and its continued effect on mortgages to date.
Section II of this Note argues that the Massachusetts “foreclosure
by entry” statutory provision unfairly burdens homeowners who are
subject to the foreclosure process. Part II.A analyzes the process of a
foreclosure by entry in Massachusetts to highlight the burdens imposed
on the homeowner by the lack of a requirement of actual notice to the
mortgagor. Further, it compares the purported constructive notice
requirement of a foreclosure by entry with the actual notice requirement
of foreclosure by power of sale to highlight the inefficacy of the former.
Part II.B discusses the removal of the thirty-day limit to record the
certificate of entry at the registry of deeds from the date of the entry.
Further, it proposes that there should be some sort of time limitation on
the recording of the certificate so as not to give the mortgagee all of the
control in the foreclosure process.
Section III of this Note focuses on statutory concerns that are raised
in examining the foreclosure by entry provision. This section maintains
that the longstanding case law on this topic is vastly outdated, and that
due to inconsistencies and ambiguities, legislative and/or judicial
clarification is necessary. Part III.A discusses the statutory requirement
that the mortgagee make an open and peaceable entry, and argues that
there is no clear definition of such an entry. Part III.B explores the
requirement of an open and continued possession by the mortgagee, and
specifically looks at what the courts mean by “actions taken by the
mortgagor adverse to the mortgagee.”14 Part III.B further discusses the
concerns raised by the lack of clarity in the statute and inconsistency in
the case law, and proposes that legislative clarification is necessary.
Section IV of this Note focuses on the issues of practicality that
arise in the context of foreclosure by entry. Part IV.A explores the

14

See infra note 208.
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common usage of foreclosure by entry, discusses the relationship
between the foreclosure by entry and the foreclosure by sale statutes, and
argues that it is used as a fall back measure that significantly advantages
the mortgagee. Part IV.B explores the mortgagor’s potential options for
redeeming the property during the three-year period and argues that there
is not much, if anything, the homeowner can do to defend against a
foreclosure by entry, unlike a foreclosure by power of sale. Part IV.C
questions the relevance of the foreclosure by entry provision given the
recent protections that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
implemented and legislation that has been passed to safeguard
homeowners in light of the foreclosure crisis. Part IV.C also discusses
the possible arguments that lending institutions could raise in support of
the validity of such foreclosures.
I. FORECLOSURE IN MASSACHUSETTS
A. What is Foreclosure?
The right to foreclose is best described as the right to cut off
completely a borrower’s or mortgagor’s right to redeem given by
equity.15 After the foreclosure, by condition of the mortgage, the estate
of the mortgagee or purchaser at a foreclosure sale becomes absolute at
law.16 Although it is most commonly referred to as a foreclosure of a
mortgage, what is actually foreclosed is the mortgagor’s right to redeem
ownership of the land from the mortgagee.17 The mortgagee’s right to
foreclose is fundamental in the nature of the mortgage process and
accrues upon the breach of a condition, the performance of which the
mortgage is intended to secure.18
Basically, foreclosure is a process in which a lending institution
attempts to recover the balance of a loan from the borrower’s security
when the borrower has stopped making payments to the lender or
defaulted on the loan in some other fashion.19 It is important to note that
15. Shepard v. Richardson, 11 N.E. 738, 747 (Mass. 1887).
16. Id. “The debtor is the ‘mortgagor . . . the creditor is the ‘mortgagee,’” and “a
‘mortgage’ is the document used to create the security interest in land.” ROGER BERNHARDT
& ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL, 343 (5th ed. 2005). In discussion
regarding mortgages and foreclosure, the homeowner-borrower is termed the “mortgagor,”
and the bank-lender is referred to as the “mortgagee.” Edith Lank, Mortgagee VS. Mortgagor,
REALTY TIMES REAL ESTATE NEWS AND ADVICE (Oct. 27, 2013, 4:48 PM),
http://realtytimes.com/consumeradvice/mortgageadvice1/item/23342-19990114_mtgevsmtgor.
17. 5 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, § 1512 (3d ed.
1939). See, e.g., Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 894 (Mass. 2011).
18. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1512.
19. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining foreclosure as
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there are various approaches to execute a foreclosure, and the procedures
used tend to vary depending on the geographic location.20
In
Massachusetts, the most common types of foreclosures used by
mortgagees are the foreclosure by power of sale and the foreclosure by
entry.21
1. Mortgage Basics
When a person borrows money to purchase real estate, the borrower
promises the lender that the money will be repaid.22 This assurance of
repayment is memorialized in a promissory note, often simply referred to
as the “note.”23 Concurrently, the borrower provides security for the
promise to repay by means of a mortgage.24 In Massachusetts, a
mortgage typically arises when the owner of real property owes a debt,
commonly to a bank or financial institution, which lends the owner the
funds necessary to acquire the real estate.25 Subsequently, the owner
conveys the property to the lender subject to defeasance upon payment
of the remaining debt.26 If and when the mortgagor pays the debt owed,
the mortgagee’s interest in the real property ceases to exist, and the
mortgage is satisfied.27 In Massachusetts, it has been long established
that a mortgage is a conveyance giving a mortgagee title to the land,
which is subject to defeasance upon performance of the condition.28

“[a] legal proceeding to terminate a mortgagor’s interest in property, instituted by the lender
(the mortgagee) either to gain title or to force a sale in order to satisfy the unpaid debt secured
by the property.”).
20. “Foreclosure processes are different in every state.” Secretary Shaun Donovan,
Foreclosure Process, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. (March 17, 2014, 2:34 PM),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/avoiding_foreclosure/ foreclosureprocess.
21. “The vast majority of foreclosures in Massachusetts involve both the sale method
and the entry method.” 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 69:16.
22. Claire Alexis Ward, Throw the Book at Them: Testing Mortgagor Remedies in
Foreclosure Proceedings after U.S. Bank v. Ibanez, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 269
(2012); see U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011).
23. Ward, supra note 21; see generally U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 941 N.E.2d 40.
24. Ward, supra note 21; see Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40; see, e.g., BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1101 (9th ed. 2009) (defining mortgage as “[a] conveyance of title to property
that is given as security for the payment of a debt or the performance of a duty and that will
become void upon payment or performance according to the stipulated terms.”). See
generally Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40.
25. 14C MASS. PRAC., Mortgages § 15.105 (4th ed. 2009); see GRANT S. NELSON &
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW, § 1.1, 1 (5th ed. 2007).
26. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105.; see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
24, § 1.1, at 1.
27. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105.; see Pineo v. White, 70 N.E.2d 294,
296 (Mass. 1946).
28. 28 MASS. PRAC., Real Estate Law § 9.2 (4th ed. 2004); see generally Pineo, 70
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2. Theories of Mortgage
There are three different theories regarding the general nature of a
mortgagee’s interest in the land in the United States.29 The recognized
theories are the title theory, the lien theory, and the intermediate theory,
which is a combination of both the title and lien theories.30
Massachusetts is among the minority of states that follow the “titletheory” of mortgages31 in which the mortgage gives the mortgagee legal
title to the real estate.32 Under the title theory the homeowner-mortgagor
maintains merely equitable title to the property.33 When the mortgage is
held separately from the note, the mortgagee holds title in trust for the
note holder, who has the equitable right to seek assignment of the
mortgage to itself.34 A mortgage therefore splits the title in two parts,
the legal title retained by a mortgagee, and the equitable title held by the
mortgagor.35 The rationale behind this theory is that up until default and
subsequent foreclosure, the mortgagor maintains full control and
possession of the property.36 The practical application is that a
mortgagor can otherwise deal with the property as his own estate,
conditioned on the mortgage.37 The main aspect of the transfer of title to
the mortgagee is to allow the mortgaged property to be available as
N.E.2d 294.
29. 33 BALDWIN’S OH. PRAC. REAL EST. LAW, Mortgages—Lien, Title, and
Intermediate Theories § 33:2 (2003).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 476 (9th ed. 2009) (defining deed of trust as
“[a] deed conveying title to real property to a trustee as security until the grantor repays a loan.
This type of deed resembles a mortgage.”).
32. “Massachusetts is among the minority of about ten states, including five of the New
England states, which follow the ‘title’ theory of mortgages.” 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note
24, § 15.105. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 4.1, at 193, n.11; Ward, supra note
21; “Massachusetts follows the title theory of mortgages. Thus, a mortgage takes the form of
a deed of conveyance of real property, transferring a fee interest to the mortgagee, defeasible
upon the performance of the conditions stated therein.” 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, §
15.116.
33. Ward, supra note 21; see U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass.
2011). See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1622 (9th ed. 2009) (defining equitable title as
“[a] title that indicates a beneficial interest in property and that gives the holder the right to
acquire formal legal title. Before the Statute of Uses (1536), an equitable title was enforceable
only in a court of chancery, not of law.”).
34. Ward, supra note 21; see Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 53.
35. “This means that when a mortgage is executed, a fee interest is conveyed to the
mortgagee subject to defeasance upon performance of the conditions stated in the mortgage,
the mortgagor retaining an ‘equity of redemption’ and the right to possession.” 14C MASS.
PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105. See Pineo v. White, 70 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Mass. 1946).
36. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see Ewer v. Hobbs, 46 Mass. 1, 3
(1842).
37. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see Ewer, 46 Mass. at 3.
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security.38 From a societal standpoint, the mortgagor is viewed as the
practical owner of the real property that is mortgaged.39 Thus,
fulfillment of all the conditions of the mortgage allow for the mortgagor
to be discharged of the mortgage obligations so as to eliminate a cloud
upon the record title to the property.40
There is one significant differentiating factor between the title
theory and the lien theory in regards to the nature of a mortgage.41 The
title theory allows for a mortgagee to enter into possession of the
mortgaged premises upon default and prior to instituting foreclosure
proceedings, whereas under the lien theory, the mortgagee has no
inherent right of possession until a foreclosure is instituted.42 The lien
theory requires the mortgagee to wait for the foreclosure of the
mortgaged property and allows the mortgagee to obtain satisfaction for
the mortgagor’s debt from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.43 This
nuance is why foreclosure by entry is not available in lien theory states,
and thus does not raise any issue.44
3. Redemption Periods
When the right of redemption came to be recognized, it also became
necessary for there to be a limited time within which this right to redeem
could be exercised.45 The rationale behind such an approach was to
provide justice to the mortgagee.46 When the mortgagor’s right of
redemption is foreclosed, the real estate is no longer mortgaged land.47

38. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see Krikorian v. Grafton Co-op. Bank,
44 N.E.2d 665, 666 (Mass. 1942).
39. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see City of Boston v. Quincy Mkt. Cold
Storage & Warehouse Co., 45 N.E.2d 959, 966 (Mass. 1942).
40. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.105; see Pineo, 70 N.E.2d at 296.
41. 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 470 (2007); see generally Maglione v. BancBoston
Mortg. Corp., 557 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
42. 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 470 (2007); see generally Maglione, 557 N.E.2d 756.
43. 55 AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 470 (2007); see generally Maglione, 557 N.E.2d 756.
44. “Strict foreclosure by entry and possession is a concomitant of the title theory of
mortgages, and makes absolute the title which the mortgagee already has by destroying the
mortgagor’s equity of redemption; it does not work under the lien theory of mortgages.” 55
AM. JUR. 2d Mortgages § 470 (2007). See Adair v. Kona Corp., 452 P.2d 449, 453 (Haw.
1969).
45. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518. See 4 JAMES KENT, KENT’S COMMENTARIES 181
(14th ed. 1896); RICHARD HOLMES COOTE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 990
(2nd ed. 1850).
46. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518. See 4 KENT, supra note 44, at ,181; COOTE, supra
note 44, at 990.
47. Santiago ex rel. Santiago v. Alba Mgmt., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Mass. App. Ct.
2010).
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Rather, the former mortgagee then becomes the owner of both the legal
and equitable interests in the property and the mortgage no longer
exists.48 There are two variations of the mortgagor’s right to redeem,
which include the equity of redemption and the statutory right of
redemption.49 In differentiating between the two variants, it is helpful to
think that equity of redemption is the period prior to the foreclosure, and
statutory redemption is the period subsequent to the foreclosure.50
a. Equity of Redemption
The equity of redemption is a concept that gives a mortgagor in
default the right to recover property prior to a foreclosure sale by paying
not only the remaining principal, but also the accrued interest and all
other costs that are due.51 Such is the case for a foreclosure by entry,
where an equitable right of redemption continues for a period of threeyears after the initial entry is made, and the foreclosure is not complete
until that right of redemption ends.52
b. Statutory Redemption Period
In many states there is a right, prescribed by statute, to endure for a
specified period to redeem the property after foreclosure.53 The statutes
expressly provide that a right of redemption shall continue for a certain
48. Id. “The mortgagor’s equitable title and right to redeem the mortgage are
extinguished by the foreclosure deed, and the mortgage is discharged at that time.” Ward,
supra note 21.
49. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (9th ed. 2009) (discussing the equity of
redemption, stating that “[a] defaulting mortgagor with an equity of redemption has the right,
until the foreclosure sale, to reimburse the mortgagee and cure the default” and further stating
that “[i]n many jurisdictions, the mortgagor also has a statutory right to redeem within six
months after the foreclosure sale.”).
50. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1548 (9th ed. 2009) (defining statutory right
of redemption); see, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (9th ed. 2009) (defining equity of
redemption).
51. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (9th ed. 2009) (defining equity of
redemption as “[t]he right of a mortgagor in default to recover property before a foreclosure
sale by paying the principal, interest, and other costs that are due”). TIFFANY, supra note 16,
§ 1500. Essentially the equity of redemption ends with the foreclosure, whether it is the
foreclosure sale or the ending of the three-year period of possession in the case of foreclosure
by entry.
52. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1500. See Clark v. Crosby, 101 Mass. 184 (1869).
53. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1500. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed.
2009) (defining statutory right of redemption as “[t]he right of a mortgagor in default to
recover property after a foreclosure sale by paying the principal, interest, and other costs that
are owed, together with any other measure required to cure the default. This statutory right
exists in many states but is not uniform.”). Essentially the statutory redemption period begins
to run when the foreclosure takes place, so it would begin when the foreclosure sale is
effectuated or after the three-year period of possession in a foreclosure by entry.
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period of time after default by the mortgagor.54 Hence, this type of
redemption is best thought of as an added period that some legislatures
have created to allow the mortgagor more time after the foreclosure sale
is executed or the three-year period of possession expires to redeem the
land.55 However, there is no such statutory redemption period in
Massachusetts.56 Therefore, once a foreclosure sale is executed and/or
the three-year period of possession in a foreclosure by entry ends, the
mortgage is forever foreclosed.57
4. When Foreclosure Can Be Instituted
Generally, the mortgagee can initiate a foreclosure at a time
specified within the mortgage documents.58 Typically, the process of
foreclosure is started by some specified period of time after a
mortgagor’s default of a condition in the mortgage.59 Under statutes
allowing foreclosure by entry and possession, the right to initiate
foreclosure proceedings does not begin to accrue until there has been a
“distinct breach of the condition of the mortgage or failure of
performance.”60
A foreclosure by power of sale may only be
implemented if there is a default of the type stipulated in the mortgage
document as authorizing the exercise of the power of sale.61 Breaching a
mortgage by defaulting on a condition specified within the mortgage
could include: the mortgagor’s stopping payment on the debt owed to the
mortgagee; not paying the amount owed in a timely fashion; not paying
the taxes due on the property; or even not securing insurance on the
mortgaged property, as in the hypothetical example given above.62

54. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining statutory right of
redemption).
55. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009).
56. 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, at app. 20A.
57. Id. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 18 (2012) (stating “[t]he mortgagor . . . may,
after breach of condition, redeem the land mortgaged, unless the mortgagee . . . has obtained
possession of the land . . . and has continued that possession for three years, or . . . the land has
been sold pursuant to a power of sale contained in the mortgage deed.”).
58. See, e.g., Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Security Instrument Form 3022 for a
Massachusetts Mortgage, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/ unifsecurity.html
(permitting the commencement of foreclosure proceedings following a thirty-day notice
period to the borrower).
59. Id.
60. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 723 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
61. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 656 (2009).
62. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27 § 9.6.
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5. Judicial Versus Non-Judicial Foreclosure
There are two distinct processes of foreclosure that are followed in
this country.63 One is a judicial or court-supervised foreclosure, and the
other is a non-judicial foreclosure where there is no court involvement.64
Judicial foreclosure, available in every state and required by many,
involves a sale of the mortgaged property under the supervision of a
court.65 The lender initiates the foreclosure by filing a lawsuit against
the mortgagor in which all the parties involved must be notified of the
impending foreclosure, and a judicial decision is subsequently
announced after exchanged pleadings.66 In a judicial foreclosure,
proceeds from the sale of the property first go toward paying the costs of
administering the foreclosure, then satisfying the mortgage, then to any
other potential lien holders, and finally to the mortgagor if there are any
proceeds remaining.67
By contrast, in a non-judicial foreclosure, the lender forecloses by
exercising the power of sale in the mortgage or by entry and possession
with little or no judicial oversight.68 Thus the non-judicial foreclosure
process is, from the mortgagee’s perspective, generally much less timeconsuming, easier, and less expensive than a judicial foreclosure while
accomplishing the same result.69 Due to the fact that Massachusetts is a
non-judicial foreclosure state, unless the mortgagor brings an action to
discontinue the foreclosure, the foreclosure proceeds without any type of
judicial intervention.70
B. Methods of Foreclosure
The various types of foreclosure that exist today all stem from the
original method of strict foreclosure, which simply vested title in the
mortgagee after the redemption period expired.71 The different methods

63. Other than strict foreclosure. 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 64:4; see
discussion infra Parts I.B.2-3.
64. 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 64:4.
65. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009).
66. See BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, §§ 16:1-16:45.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining non-judicial
foreclosure as “[a] foreclosure method that does not require court involvement.”); Elizabeth
Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: The Ibanez Time Bomb?,
4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 111, 146 (2013).
69. Renuart, supra note 67, at 171; 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 17:1.
70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2012); Ward, supra note 21.
71. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518; see 4 KENT, supra note 44, at 181; COOTE, supra
note 44, at 990.
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that eventually developed allow a foreclosure to be effectuated by
judicial action,72 by bill in equity,73 by entry and continuation of
possession for three years,74 and by auction sale executed under the
statutory power of sale within a mortgage.75 Massachusetts is a nonjudicial foreclosure state; thus, the most prevalent methods of
foreclosure are foreclosure by power of sale included in the mortgage
and foreclosure by entry and possession.76 It is commonplace to
foreclose a mortgage by exercise of a power of sale and, as a backup, by
open and peaceable entry upon the premises to ensure the validity of the
foreclosure.77
1. Strict Foreclosure
Before the courts of equity recognized the equity of redemption,
there was no need for foreclosure since the mere breach of a condition
vested an absolute estate in the mortgagee.78 Upon the development of
the equity of redemption, strict foreclosure—at one time the only method
of foreclosure—vested the title to the land in the mortgagee.79 However,
since the introduction of a foreclosure by sale of the land, this method of
foreclosure has acquired the distinctive name of “strict foreclosure.”80
Strict foreclosure does not involve any type of sale.81 In a typical strict
72. See discussion supra Part I.A.5; discussion infra Part I.B.4.
73. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 185, § 1 (2012).
74. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 11 (2012); 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, §
69:16.
76. In re Loucheschi LLC, 496 B.R. 41, 46 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013) (“There are four
ways to foreclose a mortgage under Massachusetts law: (1) by peaceable entry . . . (2) by sale
under a statutory power of sale . . . (3) by action, and (4) by a bill in equity . . . . The third
method is seldom used and the fourth is available only in extraordinary circumstances.”); see
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1, 3-10, 11-15, 17 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 185, § 1(k)
(2012).
77. 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 69:16 (“It is the usual practice to foreclose
mortgages by both open and peaceable entry and exercise of power of sale. The reasoning
being that if there should happen to be a defect in the exercise of the power of sale the
foreclosure by entry would ripen into a completely valid foreclosure with the expiration of
three years from the entry.”).
78. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518; see 4 KENT, supra note 44, at 181; COOTE, supra
note 44, at 990.
79. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining strict foreclosure
as “[a] rare procedure that gives the mortgagee title to the mortgaged property — without first
conducting a sale — after a defaulting mortgagor fails to pay the mortgage debt within a
court-specified period.”). TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518.
80. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518. See generally 4 KENT, supra note 44, at 181; 3
LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY, ch. 34,
§§ 1960–1962 (8th ed. 1928).
81. 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, at app. 20A.
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foreclosure transaction, the mortgagor is assigned a “law day” before
which he or she must redeem the property or be forever foreclosed of
any equity in such property.82 Should no one redeem the property, the
title becomes absolute in the foreclosing mortgagee on the day after the
last law day.83 In strict foreclosure, there is no statutory redemption;
rather, the court has the sole discretion to determine the amount of time
allowed for redemption based upon the equity in the property.84
In general, strict foreclosure has not been a favored method of
foreclosure in this country because it is likely to result in surrendering
the entire property on account of a debt significantly less than the value
of the real estate itself.85 Currently, strict foreclosure is not allowed in
most states, but is a permissible method of foreclosure in some.86 This
form of foreclosure is also recognized in some states as an acceptable
form of proceeding under special circumstances, but states are careful
only to allow it when it is not calculated to prejudice any of the involved
parties’ interests.87 Strict foreclosure by entry and possession has been
characterized as a “concomitant of the title theory of mortgages,”
making absolute the title which the mortgagee already holds by
extinguishing the mortgagor’s equity of redemption, and does not work
under the lien theory of mortgages.88
2. Foreclosure by Entry
A unique variation on strict foreclosure exists in Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.89 Similar to strict
foreclosure, in terms of vesting an absolute estate in the land in the
mortgagee, is foreclosure by peaceable entry of the mortgagee upon the
mortgaged premises, and the mortgagee’s retention of possession
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518.
86. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining strict
foreclosure, noting that “[t]he use of strict foreclosure is limited to special situations except in
those few states that permit this remedy generally.”). TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518.
87. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1518; see generally Wornat Dev. Corp. v. Vakalis, 529
N.E.2d 1329 (Mass. 1988).
88. Adair v. Kona Corp., 452 P.2d 449, 453 (Haw. 1969) (quoting GEORGE EDWARD
OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 908 (1951)) (“Strict foreclosure is
thought of as . . . as merely destorying [sic] all interest of the mortgagor in the property,
leaving the mortgagee’s title to it free and clear. A requirement, therefore, is that the
mortgagee must have legal title. Where he has only a legal lien with legal title in the
mortgagor, it obviously will not work.”). See also TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1512; 55 AM.
JUR. 2D Mortgages § 470 (2007).
89. 3 PATTON & PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 542 (3d ed. 2003).

BRITTANI MORGAN

104

7/13/15 7:05 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: 91

thereafter for a specified time.90 In the case of foreclosure by entry in
Massachusetts, three years after an open and peaceable entry is made
upon the mortgaged premises due to a default on the part of the
mortgagor, a mortgagee acquires an unencumbered title to the property,
free of the mortgagor’s equity of redemption.91 Thus, once a foreclosure
by entry has occurred and the three-year period has expired, the
mortgage no longer exists because the mortgagee then owns both the
legal and equitable title to the property.92 The statutory provision
requires that either a memorandum of the entry be made on the mortgage
deed and signed by the mortgagor or a certificate of entry signed under
oath by two competent witnesses be made and recorded.93
In Massachusetts, a foreclosure by entry is commonly made at the
time a foreclosure by sale is commenced, and a certificate of entry is
recorded subsequent to the foreclosure deed and affidavit.94 The
rationale behind employing both methods of foreclosure concurrently is
that any potential defect in a foreclosure sale becomes irrelevant after the
three-year right of redemption period expires.95 A consistent notion in
the realm of foreclosure law is that the mortgagor is entitled to notice of
the mortgagee’s intention to exercise its right to foreclose on the
property.96 In a foreclosure by entry and possession, such notice is said
to be given by recording a certificate or memorandum of the entry in the
appropriate registry of deeds.97
3. Foreclosure by Power of Sale
Within the category of non-judicial foreclosure is the foreclosure by
power of sale, which is authorized if a power of sale clause is included in

90. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1519.
91. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12; see Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 357, 357
(1851).
92. Santiago ex rel. Santiago v. Alba Mgmt., Inc., 928 N.E.2d 359, 364 (Mass. App. Ct.
2010).
93. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 18 (2012); Fitchburg Co-op. Bank v. Normandin, 128
N.E. 415, 416 (Mass. 1920).
94. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12 (stating that “[i]n such a case, it is
important to make the entry first before conducting the sale; once the sale is made title passes
to the high bidder and the mortgagee no longer has anything to convey.”). See Grabiel v.
Michelson, 8 N.E.2d 764, 765 (Mass. 1937).
95. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12. See e.g., 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra
note 6, § 69:16.
96. 3 PATTON & PALOMAR, supra note 88, § 542; see Barnes v. Boardman, 25 N.E.
623, 624 (Mass. 1890).
97. 3 PATTON & PALOMAR, supra note 88; see Wornat Dev. Corp. v. Vakalis, 529
N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Mass. 1988).
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the mortgage.98 The foreclosure sale process involves an auction sale of
the real estate by the mortgage holder without any court supervision.99
The power of sale foreclosure has advantages from the perspective of the
mortgagee, including the relatively short period of time required to
foreclose and the fact that it cuts off the mortgagor’s right of
redemption.100 In this type of foreclosure, the mortgagor retains the
equity of redemption up until the property is sold at auction.101 The
equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the opportunity to discharge
the mortgage by satisfying the balance on the note and settling any other
duties owed in the mortgage.102 Therefore, the mortgagor has the chance
to pay off the amount owed on the note and potentially avoid foreclosure
any time up until the property is purchased at the foreclosure auction.103
Foreclosure by power of sale requires a specific procedure in order
to provide sufficient notice to the mortgagor and other interested parties
of the mortgagee’s intent to foreclose and sell the real estate at
auction.104 Not only must the mortgagee abide by the notice requirement
in order to effectuate the foreclosure by sale, but must also do so to hold
a party liable for any deficiency between the net proceeds of the
foreclosure sale and the amount due on the note.105 The notice
requirement provides, in relevant part, that the mortgagee must send a
notice to “all persons of record as of 30 days prior to the date of sale
holding an interest in the property junior to the mortgage being
foreclosed.”106 Such a requirement ensures that all of the parties
involved in the foreclosure and the parties interested in purchasing the
property at the foreclosure sale will be notified of the impending
98. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining power-of-sale
clause as “[a] provision in a mortgage or deed of trust permitting the mortgagee or trustee to
sell the property without court authority if the payments are not made.”).
99. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining power-of-sale
foreclosure as “[a] foreclosure process by which, according to the mortgage instrument and a
state statute, the mortgaged property is sold at a non-judicial public sale by a public official,
the mortgagee, or a trustee.”). See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining foreclosure sale as “[t]he sale of mortgaged property, authorized by a court decree or
a power-of-sale clause, to satisfy the debt.”).
100. 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, § 69:16.
101. Ward, supra note 21, at 271.
102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 18 (2012); Ward, supra note 21.
103. Ward, supra note 21.
104. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 21 (2012); Ward, supra note 21.
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2012); 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, §
69:21; see Com. v. Bank of Am., No. 11–4363–BLS1, 2012 WL 6062747, 6 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Dec. 3, 2012).
106. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2012); 6 BAXTER DUNAWAY, supra note 6, §
69:21.
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foreclosure.107
4. Foreclosure by Action
A foreclosure by action or judicial foreclosure is extremely rare in
Massachusetts.108 Such a foreclosure is typically used only when the
statutory power of sale is unavailable in the terms prescribed in the
mortgage.109 Due to the fact that it is “[a] costly and time-consuming . . .
method by which the mortgaged property is sold through a court
proceeding requiring many standard legal steps,” foreclosure by judicial
action is rarely used in Massachusetts and some other states.110
C. Foreclosure Crisis: Happenings, Impact & Continued Ramifications
The United States foreclosure crisis is an ongoing and unresolved
situation that began in 2007.111 As a result of this widespread epidemic
of foreclosures initiated by large corporate lenders, more mortgagors
have entered the foreclosure process than ever.112 The economic crisis
engrossing the U.S. began when “large numbers of homeowners
defaulted on poorly underwritten subprime mortgage loans.”113 The
mortgage crisis was caused, in part, by the Great Recession and the
abundance of unemployment, which subsequently led to further financial
crisis beginning around the year 2008.114 During that initial crisis

107. This notion follows due process norms set out in Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank
& Trust Co. in terms of notifying the parties. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary and
fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”). See
discussion infra Part II.A, n.143.
108. Francis J. Nolan, Real Estate Title Practice in Massachusetts, in MASSACHUSETTS
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION § 17.2 (2013).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining judicial
foreclosure).
111. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT
CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONDITIONS 3 (2012), available at http://federal
reserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf.
112. “At the same time, an unprecedented number of households have lost, or are on the
verge of losing, their homes.” Id. at 1. See, e.g., Paul Kiel, The Great American Foreclosure
Story: The Struggle for Justice and a Place to Call Home, PROPUBLICA, Apr. 10, 2012,
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-great-american-foreclosure-story-the-struggle-forjustice-and-a-place-t/single.
113. Renuart, supra note 67, at 111.
114. “The Great Recession brought two waves of foreclosure suits. The first was the
collapse of the designed-to-fail mortgages frequently arranged by unscrupulous mortgage
brokers. . . . The unemployment crisis caused the second wave of foreclosures.” Daniel Bahls
& Katherine Hunt, Abhorring a Forfeiture: The Importance of Equitable Jurisdiction in a
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period, banks were becoming extremely aggressive and did not have
patience for homeowners who fell behind on their mortgage payments.115
In a three-month period in 2010, there was a fourteen percent increase in
the number of homeowners receiving default notices.116
During the years following the initial crisis period in 2008, many
inconsistencies occurred and, in February of 2012, five of the largest
mortgage servicers agreed to a settlement with the federal government
and forty-nine states for their deceptive mortgage practices, known as
the National Mortgage Settlement.117 This settlement required the
lenders to provide approximately twenty-six billion dollars in relief to
distressed homeowners, resulting in the second largest civil settlement in
U.S. history, following the Tobacco Settlement.118 The gravity of the
crisis is demonstrated by the fact that by April of 2012, more than four
million home mortgages had been foreclosed since the crisis began in
2007.119 Furthermore, in September of 2012, one out of every 248
households in this country received a notice of foreclosure.120 It is
important to note that a foreclosure’s impact stretches beyond the
homeowners by affecting the surrounding neighborhoods and towns as a
whole.121 Moreover, a foreclosure negatively impacts the sale of homes
Foreclosure Crisis, 41 STETSON L. REV. 779, 784-85 (2012).
115. “That increase signals banks are moving more aggressively now against borrowers
who have fallen behind on their mortgage payments than they have since industrywide [sic]
foreclosure processing problems emerged last fall.” Sharp Rise in Foreclosures as Banks
Move in, NBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2011), http:// www.nbcnews.com/id/44885991/ns/businessreal_estate/t/sharp-rise-foreclosures-banks-move. See Bahls & Hunt, supra note 113, at 78485 (discussing the collapse of the designed-to-fail mortgages frequently arranged by
unscrupulous mortgage brokers).
116. “The number of U.S. homes that received a first-time default notice during the July
to September quarter increased 14 percent compared to the second quarter of the year . . . .”
Sharp Rise, supra note 114.
117. Nelson D. Schwartz, & Julie Creswell, Mortgage Plan Gives Billions to
Homeowners, but With Exceptions, N.Y. TIMES, 9 Feb. 2012, available at,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/business/states-negotiate-26-billion-agreement-forhomeowners.html?hp&_r=0.
118. Id.
119. Kiel, supra note 111.
120. Dan Levy & Prashant Gopal, N.Y. Area Leads Rise in Foreclosure Filings, THE
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012), available at http://seattletimes.com/html/
businesstechnology/2019526047_foreclosuresrealtytracxml.html (“Stockton, Calif., led the 20
metro areas with the highest rates of foreclosure filings, at one in 67 households, more than
three times the U.S. average of one in 248.”).
121. G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURE ON FAMILIES AND
COMMUNITIES (The Urban Institute 2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/
411909_impact_of_forclosures.pdf. (“In some cases, where there are only a few foreclosures
and steps are taken to minimize the time the properties stand vacant, impacts may be slight. In
contrast, where the number of foreclosures is sizeable in a compact area, there may well be
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in surrounding neighborhoods with the increase in foreclosures causing
declines in the sale value of neighboring properties.122 In addition, areas
with higher rates of foreclosure often experience more crime, such as
abandoned houses being broken into.123 The negative impact of
foreclosures has led to an extension of the housing crisis.124
Since the beginning of the foreclosure crisis, there have been many
changes to protect homeowners in the form of proposed legislation,
judicial decisions, and programs implemented to provide assistance to
current mortgagors facing impending foreclosure.125 Most significantly,
courts have been scrutinizing whether the lending parties initiating
foreclosures against mortgagors have the right to take this action absent
the authority to enforce the note and mortgage.126 An example of this
scrutiny is the recent decision in Massachusetts of U.S. National Bank
Association v. Ibanez, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court voided two foreclosure sales because the foreclosing parties did
not hold the mortgage.127 In Ibanez, the court held that a foreclosure by
strong secondary effects on nearby properties and the impact on the neighborhood as a whole
can be dramatic.”).
122. “Housing foreclosures likely have little neighborhood impacts if there are few
foreclosures in a neighborhood and the foreclosed housing can resell quickly. However, when
there are both many foreclosures along with a sluggish housing market, foreclosures can lead
to neighborhood destabilization, which should cause house prices to further fall.” William H.
Rogers & William Winter, The Impact of Foreclosures on Neighboring Housing Sales, 31(4)
JOURNAL
OF
REAL
ESTATE
RESEARCH
455-79
(2009),
available
at
http://aux.zicklin.baruch.cuny.edu/jrer/ papers/pdf/past/vol31n04/04.455_480.pdf.
G.
THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 120 (“The Center for Responsible Lending has made
estimates of possible national and state impacts on property values, . . .They now project that
around 2.2 million foreclosures of subprime loans will occur primarily in late 2008 through
the end of 2009, and that 40.6 million homes in neighborhoods will suffer price declines
averaging $8,667 per home, resulting in a $352 billion total decline in property values.”).
123. “In 2005 and 2006, there was an annual average of 1.7 violent crime incidents per
100 houses in high-foreclosure clusters, almost three times the 0.6 average for the comparison
group.” G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., supra note 120, at 18.
124. “The conventional view among many policy analysts has been that the rising tide
of foreclosures will cause deep declines in the sales values of neighboring properties,
extending the housing crisis into local ﬁscal policy.” Rogers & Winter, supra note 121, at
455-79.
125. Avoiding Foreclosure, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. (Nov. 3, 2013),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/avoiding_foreclosure (“Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP): HAMP lowers your monthly mortgage payment to 31 percent
of your verified monthly gross (pre-tax) income to make your payments more affordable.”)
(“Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP): If you are current on your mortgage and
have been unable to obtain a traditional refinance because the value of your home has
declined, you may be eligible to refinance through HARP . . . designed to help you refinance
into a new affordable, more stable mortgage.”).
126. Renuart, supra note 67, at 111.
127. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 55 (Mass. 2011); see Renuart,
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power of sale must adhere strictly to the statutory requirements,
especially that the mortgagee be the holder of the mortgage at the time it
moves to foreclose.128 The decision in Ibanez is one of many in
Massachusetts that has held that in order to foreclose under the power of
sale, the mortgagee must strictly adhere to the relevant statutes.129 Based
upon the dicta in the relevant decisions and the recent legislative reforms
requiring lenders to act in good faith and take reasonable precautionary
steps in order to avoid foreclosure, it seems as though Ibanez is the
beginning of an era of protecting homeowners.130
II. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS SURROUNDING THE FORECLOSURE BY
ENTRY PROVISION
Let us think again about the hypothetical example outlined in the
Introduction. Mary, the young widowed mother with five small
children, working three jobs, was faced with foreclosure due to her
failure to procure homeowners insurance. The lending institution
decided to foreclose by entry and possession. Mary was not actually
made aware of the entry because it was made late at night. After three
years passed, Mary received a letter indicating that the three-year equity
of redemption on the real estate had been foreclosed, and that she should
vacate the land. This section of the Note analyzes the policy concerns
that are raised when such a major property interest is affected without
making the mortgaging homeowner truly cognizant of the approaching
foreclosure.
A. Recording of the Certificate—Sufficient Notice to the Mortgagor?
In 1975, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that it
did not seem possible for a foreclosure to be made without the mortgagor
having first received some form of notice of the proposed foreclosure
and an opportunity to defend against it.131 This notion promotes fairness
to a mortgagor, given that the mortgagor’s equity of redemption in the

supra note 67.
128. Renuart, supra note 67, at 143. See U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 941 N.E.2d 40.
129. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 55; see Eaton v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d
1118, 1126 (Mass. 2012); Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 892 (Mass. 2011).
130. Renuart, supra note 67, at 158. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 35A, 35B
(2012). See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 50 (where the court emphasized the significance of the
requirement that the mortgagee give notice to the mortgagor, stating “[t]he manner in which
the notice of the proposed sale shall be given is one of the important terms of the power, and
a strict compliance with it is essential to the valid exercise of the power,” and noting that the
“mortgagor is entitled to know who is foreclosing.”).
131. Beaton v. Land Court, 326 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass. 1975).
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property is at stake. Indeed, over a century earlier, in Thayer v. Smith,
the court held that the entry of a mortgagee was not sufficient to
commence a foreclosure without actual notice to the mortgagor, or open
and continued possession.132 However, as the statute currently reads,
there is no requirement that a mortgagee actually notify the mortgagor of
an entry.133 All that is required is that the certificate or memorandum be
recorded.134
Ordinarily, a mortgagor is entitled to receive notice of the
mortgagee’s intention to exercise his or her right to foreclose the
mortgage on the property, given in compliance with statutory
requirements.135 However, a mortgagee in actual occupation after breach
of condition has a right to enter peaceably in the presence of witnesses to
foreclose without actually notifying the mortgagor of his intention to do
so or of the fact that it has been done.136 This is because compliance
with the statute and recording the certificate or memorandum of entry
allegedly provides constructive notice to all persons involved.137 The
Massachusetts statutory provision governing foreclosure by open and
peaceable entry and possession provides:
A mortgagee may, after breach of condition of a mortgage of land,
recover possession of the land mortgaged by an open and peaceable
entry thereon, if not opposed by the mortgagor or other person
claiming it, or by action under this chapter; and possession so
obtained, if continued peaceably for three years from the date of
recording of the memorandum or certificate as provided in section
138
two, shall forever foreclose the right of redemption.

Nowhere in the statute does it expressly state that actual notice must be
sent or presented to the mortgagor.139 The statutory provision regarding
the certificate of entry provides in relevant part:
[A] memorandum of the entry shall be made on the mortgage deed
and signed by the mortgagor or person claiming under him, or a
certificate, under oath, of two competent witnesses to prove the entry
132. Thayer v. Smith, 17 Mass. 429, 429 (1821).
133. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012); 5 MASS. PRAC., Methods Of Practice §
13:11 (4th ed. 2000); see Joyner v. Lenox Sav. Bank, 76 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Mass. 1947).
134. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012); 5 MASS. PRAC., supra note 133, § 13:11;
see Joyner, 76 N.E.2d at 174.
135. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 726 (2009); see Barnes v. Boardman, 25 N.E. 623 (Mass.
1890).
136. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 726 (2009); see Hobbs v. Fuller, 75 Mass. 98, 98 (1857).
137. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 726 (2009); see Joyner, 76 N.E.2d at 175.
138. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
139. Id.
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shall be made. Such memorandum or certificate shall after the
entry . . . be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or
140
district where the land lies . . . .

Thus, in order for a foreclosure by entry to be effective, either: (1)
the memorandum must be entered on the mortgage and signed by the
mortgagor, which provides actual notice, or (2) the certificate must be
recorded in the registry of deeds, which supposedly provides
constructive notice to the parties involved of the impending
foreclosure.141
In Fletcher v. Cary, the court held that the recording of the
certificate of entry “is a full and authoritative notice to all persons of the
fact and date of the mortgagee’s peaceable entry” as well as the
mortgagee’s intent to foreclose the property.142 The Fletcher court
supported its analysis by stating that “[i]t is not an entry for the purpose
of literally ousting and expelling the mortgagor . . . it is for the purpose
of giving ‘ample and full notice to the mortgagor that his right of
redeeming will be gone in three years.’”143 The court went so far as to
state that so long as the entry is duly recorded, “it is wholly immaterial
whether the owner of the equity of redemption had actual knowledge of
it or not.”144 Further, over a century later, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reaffirmed this notion in holding that the recorded
certificate of entry required by statute provides sufficient notice of the
mortgagee’s intent to foreclose by entry and possession.145 This line of
authority begs the question whether, in fact, this method of giving notice
to the mortgagor through recording of a certificate at the registry of
deeds does give ample and full notice to the mortgagor of the impending
foreclosure.
As Massachusetts follows the title theory of mortgages, the
mortgagee holds the legal title to the mortgaged property, and the
mortgagor retains an equity of redemption in the property.146 The
statutory provisions, giving a considerable time after the entry is made in
which the real estate may be redeemed, are said to mitigate the severity
of foreclosing by an open and peaceable entry as opposed to foreclosure

140. Id. § 2.
141. Id.
142. Fletcher v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475, 477 (1870).
143. Id. at 477.
144. Id. at 478.
145. Wornat Dev. Corp. v. Vakalis, 529 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Mass. 1988).
146. Araserv, Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass’n, Inc., 437 F.
Supp. 1083, 1092 (D. Mass. 1977).
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by power of sale.147 In Massachusetts, there is a three-year period
following the initial entry in which the mortgagor may seek to redeem
his rights in the property before his equity of redemption is forever
foreclosed.148 Although three years seems to be a fair allowance for a
redemption period, this would not effectively act as a mitigating factor if
the mortgagor is never made aware of the entry itself. Arguably, a
mortgagor who stops paying on a mortgage and never attempts to cure
the default with the mortgagee would likely be aware that his or her real
estate might be foreclosed upon. In addition, it is possible that if a
power of sale foreclosure is executed at the same time as a foreclosure
by entry, the mortgagor could conceivably have inquiry notice of the
latter.149 However, it is also possible that a mortgagor could default in
some other way in which he or she may not be as aware of the possibility
of foreclosure, such as not renewing the insurance on the property, in
which case the redemption period would not serve its intended
purpose.150
After a mortgagor’s breach of a condition of the mortgage, “an
entry or an attempt to gain possession on the part of the mortgagee is
presumed to be for the purpose of foreclosure.”151 Therefore, if a
mortgagor in breach of a condition of the mortgage were to witness the
mortgagee entering upon the property in the presence of two witnesses,
the mortgagor could presume that it is for the purpose to foreclose.152
Furthermore, due to the fact that the statutory provision allows for a
memorandum on the mortgage signed by the mortgagor, it is also
possible for the mortgagor to gain notice of the foreclosure by signing
that memorandum.153 However, it seems that the majority of foreclosure
by entry cases involve a certificate signed in the presence of two

147. TIFFANY, supra note 16, § 1519; see Frankowich v. Szczuka, 71 N.E.2d 761
(Mass. 1947).
148. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
149. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining inquiry notice
as “[n]otice attributed to a person when the information would lead an ordinarily prudent
person to investigate the matter further.”). However, this could be discounted by the notion of
an ordinarily prudent person. Such a person might assume that if they are only made aware of
the foreclosure executed under the power of sale in their mortgage, that that is the extent of the
foreclosure proceedings with which they are a party of.
150. This is akin to the situation in the hypothetical example given in the Introduction,
where a mortgaging homeowner does not re-procure insurance on the mortgaged real estate.
See discussion supra Introduction.
151. Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36, 38-39 (1873).
152. Id. at 36.
153. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1, 2 (2012); see Fitchburg Co-op. Bank v.
Normandin, 128 N.E. 415, 415-16 (Mass. 1920).
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witnesses rather than a memorandum signed by the mortgagor.154
Therefore, by default, recording a certificate of entry is the more
prevalent method, and thus the likelihood that the mortgagor would be
put on notice is decreased.155
In the more recent decision of Pellegrini v. Silva, the Massachusetts
Appellate Court affirmed the notion that the recorded certificate of entry
required by statute is ample notice of the mortgagee’s intent to foreclose
by entry and possession.156 In support of its decision, the court reasoned
that the mortgagors, as landowners, had a duty to monitor their title.157
Moreover, the court noted that, “[f]or more than [one hundred fifty]
years, courts in the Commonwealth have repeatedly affirmed that a duly
recorded entry is sufficient notice under this statute.”158 The alleged
constructive notice that stems from the recording of the certificate of
entry is in contrast to actual notice, which is required by statute for
foreclosures by power of sale.159 The object of the provision regarding
the memorandum or certificate necessary to effectuate a foreclosure by
entry is to give notice to all persons involved.160 However, based upon
both the available case law and notions of common sense, it seems as
though providing this type of purported constructive notice does not
accomplish the task of delivering notice to all parties, and that actual
notice should in fact be required.161
154. See 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.1 (offering a checklist for conducting a
foreclosure under a statutory power of sale, including having an “officer or mortgagee make
entry onto the property before two witnesses and execute a Certificate of Entry attesting the
same.”).
155. Id.
156. Pellegrini v. Silva, 876 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 (2012) (“The mortgagee . . . may . . . perform all
acts authorized or required by the power of sale; provided, however, that no sale . . . shall be
effectual to foreclose a mortgage, unless, previous to such sale, notice of the sale has been
published once in each of 3 successive weeks, . . . in a newspaper published in the city or town
where the land lies . . . and notice of the sale has been sent by registered mail to the owner or
owners of record of the equity of redemption as of 30 days prior to the date of sale . . . .”).
However, it is questionable whether the recording act requires the homeowner to check for the
presence of such certificates.
160. Lennon v. Porter, 71 Mass. 318, 319 (1855). If a contractor were to file a
mechanics lien against a property, most states require that before the mechanics lien can be
attached the contractor must give notice of the lien to the homeowner. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra
note 27, § 11.18. It would seem logical to require the same actual notice requirement for
attaching a certificate of entry to effectuate a foreclosure on mortgaged property.
161. It has been argued that not only does the foreclosure by entry provision unfairly
burden mortgagors, but also that “[a]s it is presently practiced in Massachusetts, with the
sanction of our state courts, foreclosure by entry violates the constitutional principle of
fundamental fairness . . . . [and that] [t]here must be at least actual ‘reasonable notice’ to the

BRITTANI MORGAN

114

7/13/15 7:05 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: 91

Furthermore, the view that lay homeowners can and should
periodically check the record title for their property at the registry of
deeds is not realistic.162 As a practical matter, absent some specific
reason to check the record title of their property, ordinary people do not
make it a custom to consult the registry of deeds records concerning their
property.163 Requiring mortgagors to continually refer to the registry of
deeds to guarantee that there is no certificate of entry recorded on their
property to ensure that they are not the subject of an impending
foreclosure “is akin to requiring citizens check court dockets periodically
to learn whether they have been sued, in lieu of requiring service of civil
process on each defendant.”164 This is an interesting comparison, and in
fact, is a strong parallel lending weight to the assertion that burdening
the homeowner with such a responsibility is simply not realistic.
In the arena of foreclosure, where such a fundamental property right
is at stake, it seems fairly apparent that the mortgagor should receive
actual notice165 of the institution of a foreclosure by entry and the
beginning of the ensuing three-year redemption period. In order to
establish actual notice to all parties involved in the foreclosure by entry
process, usually consisting predominantly of the mortgagor(s), the use of
personal service or certified mail service can be required.166
borrower that a foreclosure by entry is about to occur.” 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, §
10.12; see e.g., Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 127-28 (1934) (“[W]hether it affect
property or liberty or life, the Fourteenth Amendment commands the observance of that
standard of common fairness, . . . It is fundamental that there can be no due process without
reasonable notice and a fair hearing.”). Furthermore, in Pellegrini v. Silva, the court held that
because the mortgagee satisfied the notice requirements of the statute, the case presented “no
occasion to determine whether the due process clause even has any applicability to nonjudicial mortgage foreclosures.” 876 N.E.2d 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
162. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12; see Pellegrini, 876 N.E.2d (“[T]he
Silvas, as landowners, had a duty to monitor their title. Pellegrini had no duty to provide
notice beyond that required by the governing statute.”).
163. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12 (“Unless there is some specific reason to
do so, (such as a pending sale, refinance, construction loan disbursement, or perhaps some
perceived danger of attachment or levy on execution), ordinary people do not as a practical
matter make it a habit to consult registry of deeds records concerning their property.”).
164. Id. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (quoting Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), holding that “[b]efore a State may take
property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the government to provide the owner ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case.’”). As the same fundamental right to property is at stake in the realm
of taxation as well as foreclosure, it allows for the inference that the same notice requirement
should be applied.
165. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining actual notice as
“[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.”).
166. 28 MASS. PRAC., supra note 27, § 10.12. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
719 (9th ed. 2009) (defining personal service as “[a]ctual delivery of the notice or process to
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B. Should There Be a Time Limit on Recording the Certificate?
The Massachusetts foreclosure by entry provision was developed
early on and has gone through extensive changes in its requirements.167
Prior to 1785, any lawful entry by the mortgagee after a broken
condition and the lapse of three years worked a foreclosure.168 At that
point, it was provided that the mortgagor might redeem, unless the
mortgagee had entered in presence of two witnesses, and continued in
peaceable possession for three years.169 Up until 1991, there was an
added requirement, which provided that “a certificate under oath of two
competent witnesses shall be made and recorded within 30 days of the
entry.”170 With this time limit imposed on the recording of the certificate
of entry, if the certificate was recorded more than thirty days following
the date of entry, the entry was invalidated, and any subsequent
foreclosure relying on that entry was ineffectual.171
By amendment in 1991, however, the time limits for recording the
mortgagee’s affidavit and/or the certificate of entry have been
removed.172 Therefore, the three-year redemption period for certificates
of entry to cure sale defects does not begin to run until the certificate is
in fact recorded, no matter when that occurs.173 This concept seems to
disadvantage the mortgagor because it gives absolute control to the
mortgagee in regards to when to record the certificate, which begins the
three-year redemption period.174 Due to the fact that the mortgagor
the person to whom it is directed.”). See Receipt for Certified Mail, USPS.COM
https://store.usps.com/store/browse/productDetailSingleSku.jsp?productId=P_FORM_3800&c
ategoryId=priority-mail (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (providing that the receipt for certified
mail provides the sender with “a mailing receipt and, upon request electronic verification that
an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made.”). By requiring the use of
personal service or certified mail it would ensure that the mortgaging homeowner is actually
made aware of the approaching foreclosure and thus the three-year period of redemption.
167. See Mortgages—Foreclosure—Recordation, Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 157 (H.B.
5752) (1991). See generally Nolan, supra note 107, § 17.4.1. See Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass.
357, 359 (1851).
168. Whitney v. Guild, 77 Mass. 496, 501 (1860).
169. Id. at 501.
170. Fitchburg Co-op. Bank v. Normandin, 128 N.E. 415, 416 (Mass. 1920). See
Mortgages—Foreclosure—Recordation, Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 157 (H.B. 5752) (1991).
171. See Fitchburg Co-op. Bank, 128 N.E. at 416.
172. See Mortgages—Foreclosure—Recordation, Mass. Legis. Serv. Ch. 157 (H.B.
5752) (1991).
173. 15A MASS. PRAC., Mortgage § 28:82 (4th ed. 2008). “Prior to 1991, the
mortgagee was required to record the certificate of entry within thirty days . . . . Currently, a
delay in the recording of a certificate of entry only serves to delay the start of the three-year
redemption period.” NOLAN, supra note 107, § 17.4.1.
174. The statute does not include a limitation on when the mortgagee is able to record
the certificate of entry, which gives way for the inference that the mortgagee remains in

BRITTANI MORGAN

116

7/13/15 7:05 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: 91

could stand to lose their stake in the property, it would seem reasonable
to allow for either the redemption period to begin running on the date of
the entry,175 or to require the certificate to be recorded within a specified
period from the date of the entry.176 Therefore, the fact that there is no
longer a requirement to record the certificate of entry at the time of the
entry or soon thereafter adds preventable uncertainty and difficulty in
providing notice to the mortgagor.177
III. STATUTORY ISSUES REGARDING THE FORECLOSURE BY ENTRY
PROVISION
Chapter 244, sections one and two of the Massachusetts General
Laws, which allow for the entry of a mortgagee upon the premises for
breach of a condition of the mortgage and for the purpose of foreclosure,
require an entry be “peaceable” and “open.”178 It is usually stated that
the entry “is peaceable if not opposed by the mortgagor or other person
claiming the premises; and . . . open if made in the presence of two
competent witnesses whose certificate thereof is sworn to and duly
recorded . . . where the land lies.”179 Under this view, the entry is
“peaceable” if unopposed by the mortgagor and “open” if made in the
presence of two competent witnesses.180 Both of these statutory
requirements have been interpreted fairly broadly.181
A. The Open and Peaceable Entry: Just What Does it Entail?
The statute provides that a mortgagor may make an open and
peaceable entry upon the mortgaged property if not opposed by the
control of the process. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 2 (2012).
175. This would seem to be a just resolution only if the mortgagor signed the
memorandum, which would ensure that the mortgagor received actual notice of the entry.
176. This requirement would apply if the certificate of entry was used.
177. A time limit on the recording of the certificate seems to be a good provision that
was removed because without it, one could imagine a scenario where a homeowner witnesses
the mortgagee making an entry and immediately goes to check the registry of deeds but sees
nothing recorded. The homeowner periodically consults the registry over the next few weeks,
and still nothing is recorded, and the mortgagor subsequently forgets about the entry. Then,
several years later, the mortgagee could take the certificate of entry that was produced but not
yet recorded, record it, and then three years from that date, the foreclosure would be
effectuated.
178. Thompson v. Kenyon, 100 Mass. 108, 108 (1868); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 2
(2012).
179. Thompson, 100 Mass. at 108; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 2.
180. Thompson, 100 Mass. at 108; 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.129.
181. See discussion supra Introduction, note 12; Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161, 163
(1864) (where the mortgage was found to have been successfully foreclosed by entry and
possession even though the entry was made in secret during the nighttime).
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mortgagor or other person claiming the premises.182 What constitutes
open and peaceable and what it takes to oppose the mortgagee is left
open-ended and leaves such interpretation open for a case-by-case
analysis.183 Not only does this provide for much confusion in terms of
construing the statute, but also the lack of direction from the legislature
prevents administrative ease that is desired from a statute.184
An entry on one of multiple lots included within the same mortgage
has proven sufficient to satisfy the entry requirement of the statute, even
though the properties may be distant from each other.185 Therefore,
because in such a situation the mortgagor cannot be present at all of the
locations, it leaves open the possibility that the mortgagor would be
completely unaware of the so-called “open” entry. Furthermore, it is no
valid objection to an entry that it was made in the nighttime, and an entry
may also be upheld even if carried out in secret.186 By allowing for such
seemingly secret entries to satisfy the openness requirement of the
statute, mortgagees are significantly advantaged as they may institute a
foreclosure without the mortgagor’s knowledge.187 Further, an analysis
of these outcomes leaves one wondering what constitutes an entry that is
not open if an entry done at night or in secret satisfies the requirement of
openness.188
In Walker v. Thayer, the mortgagee was found not to have entered
with force and violence when a crow bar was used to remove the
window fasteners on the mortgagor’s house.189
However, the
mortgagor’s resistance to such entry, which included throwing hot water
at the mortgagee and hitting him with a stick, was found to be sufficient
to oppose the entry.190 This case seems to leave open for interpretation
the issue of what constitutes a “non-peaceable” entry if effectively
breaking into the premises was found to be peaceable.191 Further, the
182. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012); Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36, 39
(1873).
183. See discussion of Walker v. Thayer supra Introduction, note13.
184. ANNE WAGNER & SOPHIE CACCIAGUIDI-FAHY, OBSCURITY AND CLARITY IN THE
LAW: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES xiii (2008) (stating that “[i]t is important to note that the
concept of clarity has progressively moved to the mainstream of legal scholarship.”).
185. Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161, 163 (1864).
186. Id. at 163; Fletcher v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475, 477 (1870).
187. Ellis, 90 Mass. at 163 (entry on the premises was made in secret during the
nighttime, and was upheld as a valid entry). A mortgagor would not be aware of such an entry
as it was purposely done covertly.
188. Id. at 163; Fletcher, 103 Mass. at 477.
189. Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36, 38 (1873).
190. Id. at 38.
191. Id. at 38.
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case law is not clear as to whether anything less aggressive than
throwing boiling water at the mortgagee will constitute a sufficient
opposition.192 These situations present the problem that a mortgagor
cannot oppose an entry of which he or she is unaware due to the fact that
the entry is made at night, in secret, or on a different tract of land held by
the mortgagor under the same mortgage. It follows logically that in
order for a mortgagor to effectively oppose the mortgagee’s entry, the
mortgagor must first be aware of the entry.
The courts’ longstanding holdings regarding the “open and
peaceable entry” requirement seem to give an overbroad definition of
both terms.193 Moreover, the relevant cases on this issue date back to the
eighteenth century, and it seems as though much of the case law is
simply outdated.194
B. What, if Anything, Interrupts Such Possession Gained Through
Entry?
The current rule of law seems to hold that, “the entry by the
mortgagee for condition broken, in the presence of two witnesses, and a
certificate thereof duly sworn to . . . and duly recorded, are all that is
necessary to effect a foreclosure.”195 In fact, cases that have interpreted
the foreclosure by entry statute “have long held that a mortgagee who
has made peaceful entry on the property and duly recorded a certificate
of entry need not do anything further to establish possession.”196 Thus, it
has been held that once an entry is made, in the absence of anything to
the contrary, it can be assumed that the mortgagee’s possession was
sufficient to satisfy the statute.197 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts198 established that the possession the mortgagee is
required to acquire and maintain to effectuate a foreclosure by entry is
not a personal occupation of the mortgaged estate by himself.199 The
statutory requirements have been characterized as “a formal entry, and a

192. Id. at 38.
193. See discussion supra Introduction, note 12; discussion supra Part III, note 180.
194. See, e.g., Walker v. Thayer, 113 Mass. 36 (1873); Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161
(1864); Lennon v. Porter, 71 Mass. 318 (1855); Bennett v. Conant, 64 Mass. 163, 167 (1852);
Fay v. Valentine, 22 Mass. 418, 425 (1827); Skinner v. Brewer, 21 Mass. 468 (1827); Thayer
v. Smith, 17 Mass. 429 (1821).
195. Ellis, 90 Mass. at 163-64.
196. HS Land Trust LLC v. Gonzalez, No. 11 MISC. 446482(KCL), 2012 WL
5362885, *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 30, 2012).
197. Singh v. 207-211 Main St., LLC, 937 N.E.2d 977, 978 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).
198. Hereinafter “SJC.”
199. Fletcher v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475, 477 (1870).
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constructive rather than a literal taking of possession.”200
Due to the fact that actual physical possession by the mortgagee is
not required,201 it is hard to imagine what the mortgagor can do to defend
against or oust the mortgagee’s possession. In fact, in HS Land Trust
LLC v. Gonzalez, a judge of the Massachusetts Land Court held that the
mortgagee was able to establish possession despite the fact that for
nearly two decades, he never resided on the property, paid no taxes,
purchased no insurance, collected no rent, and the property had been
conveyed several times.202 Therefore, HS Land Trust LLC reaffirmed
that entering upon the property and recording its certificate of entry is all
that is necessary for a mortgagee to establish possession of the
mortgaged property.203
The judge reasoned that because the mortgagee had fulfilled both of
those requirements, it did all it was required by law to do.204 The court
reasoned that once the mortgagee had successfully acquired possession
by making an entry and recording the necessary certificate, “[the]
possession [then] continue[d] until the mortgagor [took] some act that
[was] adverse to the mortgagee’s possession.”205 The judge held that the
mortgagee was not required to do anything more than what was done,
and that the mortgagee’s inaction could not be construed as an intent to
waive the rights it gained by making a peaceable entry.206
However, over a century earlier in Lennon v. Porter, the SJC held it
was well established that “a mortgagor, especially after entry, cannot
disseize his mortgagee, or defeat his right of possession.”207 The court
went on to state that “[a]ll such acts are held to be done in subordination
to the title of his mortgagee.”208 Yet in the same opinion, the court
stated that the object of the foreclosure by entry provision is to “give
notice to all persons concerned . . . after such entry, and the lapse of
three years therefrom, if no steps are taken to redeem, the mortgagee’s
estate becomes absolute, and all who claim under the original
200. Id. at 477.
201. This is inferred from the lack of an actual notice requirement in the statute. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
202. HS Land Trust LLC v. Gonzalez, No. 11 MISC. 446482(KCL), 2012 WL
5362885, *2 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 30, 2012).
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2-3.
207. Lennon v. Porter, 71 Mass. 318, 320 (1855).
208. Id. at 320. (It seems that the SJC in Lennon stated nothing could be done by the
mortgagor to defeat the mortgagee’s possession after an entry. However, in HS Land Trust
LLC, the Land Court held possession continues until an adverse act by the mortgagor). No. 11
MISC. 446482(KCL), 2012 WL 5362885, *3 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 30, 2012).

BRITTANI MORGAN

120

7/13/15 7:05 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: 91

mortgagor . . . are barred.”209 A few years prior to the decision in Swift
was that of Ayres v. Waite, in which the court pointed to the dictum
found in Cholmondely v. Clinton, 2 Meriv. 360, stating,
[T]hat the mortgagor cannot disseise the mortgagee, because, . . . the
mortgagor’s possession is not properly his own, but that of the
mortgagee. The seisin of the mortgagor, although his own for some
purposes, is the seisin of the mortgagee, in what regards their
reciprocal relations and rights; and the disseisin of the mortgagor is
210
the disseisin of the mortgagee.

Therefore, both of these cases, from 1855 and 1852 respectively, firmly
commanded the proposition that there was nothing a mortgagor could do
to disturb the mortgagee’s possession.211 This apparent discrepancy
within the decision in Lennon and between it and the court in HS Land
Trust emphasizes the need for clarification.212
However, the apparent discrepancy between the two
aforementioned holdings seems to be resolved in part by the case of
Holmes v. Turner’s Falls Lumber Co., which stated that to constitute a
disseisin of a mortgagee by a mortgagor, it must be made known to the
mortgagee that the mortgagor or his grantees made some claim adverse
to the mortgagee.213 The court noted in their opinion that there were
expressions in its reports to the effect that a mortgagor cannot disseise
his mortgagee.214 Yet, the court reasoned that the statement of the law
generally made is that “neither the mortgagor nor his grantee holds
adversely to the mortgagee until he has distinctly disclaimed holding
under him, and asserted title in himself.”215 Therefore, the court seems
to have noticeably recognized that previous decisions had stated that the
mortgagor could not do anything to disseize the mortgagee, and held to
the contrary that the mortgagor could in fact establish an adverse holding
to the mortgagee.216
Additionally, in Long v. Richards, the court addressed the apparent
inconsistency, noting that it “would be odd if statutory language, which
seems so clearly to require possession of a kind which is recognized as
capable of interruption, should be held to have created a purely fictitious
209. Lennon, 71 Mass. at 319.
210. Ayres v. Waite, 64 Mass. 72, 74-75 (1852).
211. Lennon, 71 Mass. at 320; Ayres, 64 Mass. at 74-75.
212. Lennon, 71 Mass. at 320; HS Land Trust LLC, 2012 WL 5362885 at *2-3.
213. Holmes v. Turner’s Falls Lumber Co., 23 N.E. 305, 310 (Mass. 1890).
214. Id. at 310.
215. Id. at 310-11 (emphasis added) (quoting EMORY WASHBURN ET AL., A TREATISE
th
ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 154 (5 ed. 1887).
216. Id. at 310.
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and constructive possession, with which no one could interfere.”217
However, the court in Long went on to state, “we take the tradition of the
court as we find it, and, on any question of title, apply it as it has been
applied.”218 It seems that the court in Long realized that not only was
there noticeable disconnect between the longstanding court holdings and
logic, but also that the consistently upheld notion of the unbeatable
possession simply did not make sense.219
In Beaton v. Land Court, the court noted that even if the mortgagor
violates the conditions of the mortgage and the mortgagee commences
foreclosure proceedings, the mortgagor still might redeem the mortgaged
property and obtain an accounting by appropriate proceedings before the
foreclosure is completed.220 Moreover, this issue was discussed in the
more recent case of Pellegrini v. Silva, where it was held to be the
mortgagor’s responsibility to file suit or otherwise oppose the
mortgagee’s occupancy during the three-year period after the mortgagee
recorded notice of her entry in order for the mortgagee’s possession to be
interrupted.221 Therefore, the current interpretation of the possession
requirement of the foreclosure by entry provision is that the mortgagor is
able to overcome the mortgagee’s possession.222 However, what
constitutes such requisite opposition by the mortgagor is far from
clear.223 As neither the statutory provisions nor the relevant case law
describes just what an act adverse to the mortgagee is, the issue lends
itself to a case-by-case analysis in which certain acts of the mortgagor
are determined to be adverse to the mortgagee or not.224 Further, with all
that is needed to meet the requirements being an entry and recording of a
certificate, it seems as though it would be rather simple for the
mortgagee to establish possession without actual notice to the mortgagor
and nearly impossible for the mortgagor to interrupt such acquired
possession.225
217. Long v. Richards, 48 N.E. 1083, 1086 (Mass. 1898).
218. Id. at 1086.
219. Id. at 1086.
220. Beaton v. Land Court, 326 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass. 1975).
221. Pellegrini v. Silva, 876 N.E.2d 498, n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
222. Id. at n.4.
223. See discussion supra Introduction, note 13.
224. See generally HS Land Trust LLC v. Gonzalez, No. 11 MISC. 446482(KCL), 2012
WL 5362885 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 30, 2012) (mortgagor’s continued possession for over
eighteen years was found not to be adverse to the mortgagee); Bennett v. Conant, 64 Mass.
163 (1852) (mortgagee’s allowing the mortgagor to continue in possession of the real estate
was found not to be adverse to the mortgagee’s possession).
225. The relevant holdings have recognized entries made in secret and unbeknownst to
the mortgagor, and case law does not articulate any standard test or factors that need to be met
in order to constitute acts adverse to the mortgagee’s possession. See e.g., Ellis v. Drake, 90
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In Pellegrini v. Silva, the occurrence of disputes between the
mortgagor and mortgagee, and the fact that the mortgagee was in
possession of the property before the date upon which she began the
foreclosure by entry, did not render her entry defective under the
statute.226 Additionally, allowing the mortgagor to remain on the
mortgaged premises has been held not to be adverse to the mortgagee’s
possession.227 The court in Bennett v. Conant went further to state that
after an entry should the mortgagee permit the mortgagor to occupy such
premises, as a matter of lenience or mutual convenience, without any
agreement to waive the entry, “the mortgagor must be taken to be the
tenant at will228 of the mortgagee.”229 Hence, the possession of the
mortgagor would, in effect, be for the possession of the mortgagee, and
therefore not adverse as it would not interrupt the continuity of the
mortgagee’s legal possession.230 Thus, if the mortgagor continues in
possession of the premises, he is but a sort of tenant at sufferance to the
mortgagee because that possession of the mortgagor is merely
permissive and at sufferance of the mortgagee.231
Likewise, in Cunningham v. Davis, the court reaffirmed that after
such an entry to foreclose, the mortgagor and those claiming under him
became tenants at sufferance of the mortgagee.232 The court noted that
in the absence of any evidence of an adverse holding, the mortgagor and
those claiming under him are assumed to hold under the mortgagee, and
that their possession is his during the three years until the completion of
the foreclosure.233
In Swift v. Mendell, the court noted that there was no importance in
the fact that there was no change in the mortgagor’s occupation of the
land.234 The court reasoned that there is an obvious distinction between
Mass. 161 (1864); Lennon v. Porter, 71 Mass. 318 (1855); Bennett, 64 Mass. at 167; Fay v.
Valentine, 22 Mass. 418, 425 (1827); Skinner v. Brewer, 21 Mass. 468 (1827); Thayer v.
Smith, 17 Mass. 429 (1821); Singh v. 207-211 Main St., LLC, 937 N.E.2d 977 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2010); Pellegrini, 876 N.E.2d 498; HS Land Trust, 2012 WL 5362885.
226. Pellegrini, 876 N.E.2d.
227. Bennett, 64 Mass. at 167.
228. The court seems to use the terms “tenant at will” and “tenant at sufferance”
interchangeably in referring to the mortgagor who remains in possession of the foreclosed real
estate. See e.g., Bennett, 64 Mass. 163 (characterizing the mortgagor as a tenant at will of the
mortgagee); Ayres v. Waite, 64 Mass. 72, 74 (1852) (referring to the mortgagor as a tenant at
will or at sufferance of the mortgagee); Fay, 22 Mass. at 425 (denoting the mortgagor as a
tenant at will of the mortgagee).
229. Bennett, 64 Mass. at 167.
230. Id. at 167.
231. Ayres, 64 Mass. at 74.
232. Cunningham v. Davis, 56 N.E. 2, 5 (1900).
233. Id. at 5.
234. Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 357, 358 (1851).
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the occupation and possession of an estate.235 It is clear that the line of
authority on this issue stands for the proposition that the mortgagor’s
continued possession is considered to be for the possession of the
mortgagee.236 However, the cases conflict with regards to whether the
mortgagor has the ability to oppose the mortgagee’s possession by an act
adverse to the mortgagee.237 Furthermore, there is no well-defined
standard for establishing when an act rises to the level of being adverse
to the mortgagee.238
All of these problems present with the
Massachusetts foreclosure by entry statute call for legislative or judicial
clarification.
IV. PRACTICAL ISSUES STEMMING FROM THE FORECLOSURE BY
ENTRY PROVISION
A. Foreclosure By Entry as a Fallback—Advantages of the Mortgagee
It is common practice for mortgagees to use foreclosure by entry
and foreclosure by power of sale concurrently.239 Oftentimes, a
mortgagee employs both foreclosure methods concurrently by making a
peaceable entry on the premises and recording a certificate thereof so as
to initiate the foreclosure by entry process, while at the same time
beginning the process of exercising a power of sale in the mortgage.240
In doing so, the mortgagee is able to ensure that in the case of some
defect arising in one of the methods used, the mortgagor’s equity of
redemption will be foreclosed by the proper employment of the other
235. “[W]e consider that the mortgagor continued as before, occupying the premises;
but the difference is, that after the entry to foreclose, he held as tenant to the mortgagee and in
subordination to his right of possession.” Id. at 358.
236. Ayres v. Waite, 64 Mass. at 74-75.
237. See e.g., Holmes v. Turner’s Falls Lumber Co., 23 N.E. 305 (Mass. 1890) (stating
that in order for the mortgagor to disseize the mortgagee it must be made known to the
mortgagee that the mortgagor made some claim adverse to the mortgagee); Lennon v. Porter,
71 Mass. 318 (1855) (stating that the mortgagor cannot disseize its mortgagee, or defeat its
right of possession because all acts are considered to be done in subordination to the title of
the mortgagee); Ayres, 64 Mass. at 72 (stating that the mortgagor cannot disseize the
mortgagee because the mortgagor’s possession is not his own).
238. The statute provides no clear direction to what would constitute an act adverse to
the mortgagee. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012). None of the relevant cases provide a
standard either. See e.g., Holmes, 23 N.E. 305; Lennon, 71 Mass. 318; Ayres, 64 Mass. 72.
239. Harlow Realty Co. v. Cotter, 187 N.E. 118, 119 (1933). “Although either
[foreclosure by power of sale or foreclosure by entry] can be used individually, the ‘belt and
suspenders’ combination of both methods [of foreclosure] serves best to provide a title that is
insulated from collateral attack in both the short and the long term.” Nolan, supra note 107, §
17.4.
240. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.127; Harlow Realty Co. v. Cotter, 187 N.E.
at 119 (stating “[i]t is common practice for mortgagees to use both these methods of
foreclosure concurrently.”).
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method.241 This stems from the notion that foreclosure by entry allows a
ground for a claim of clear title separate from the foreclosure by power
of sale.242 Massachusetts’s system allows foreclosing parties to correct
defects in their authority to foreclose on property after the completion of
a sale by utilizing the foreclosure by entry procedure.243 It seems as
though allowing the mortgagee to employ two distinct methods of
foreclosure at the same time does nothing more than to ensure that the
mortgagee is able to foreclose.244
B. Available Remedies to Homeowners for Redeeming the Premises
and Defending Against Foreclosures By Entry
The most obvious defense against a foreclosure is that the
mortgagor did not in fact default on any of the conditions of the
mortgage.245 Another defense is that the party foreclosing lacked
“jurisdiction and authority” to effect such foreclosure.246 This notion
was recently affirmed in the landmark case of U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v.
Ibanez, in which the SJC of Massachusetts held foreclosure sales to be
invalid because the purchasers failed to show they were the mortgage
holders at the time of foreclosure.247
Another possible defense against a foreclosure by entry is waiver.248
A waiver may either be express or implied by conduct inconsistent with
an intention to retain the benefit of the entry and complete the
foreclosure in that fashion.249 The mortgagor’s continued possession
241. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.127; see Grabiel v. Michelson, 8 N.E.2d
764, 765 (Mass. 1937) (foreclosure by entry and possession was valid even though there may
have been irregularities in the exercise of the power of sale in the mortgage).
242. U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49 n.15 (Mass. 2011).
243. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 1, 2 (2012); see Renuart, supra note 67, at 149.
244. The notion that the only purpose the provision serves is a safety net for mortgagees
is further demonstrated by an excerpt from a practice guide stating that, “[s]ince the Land
Court requirements for notice tend to be more strict than those of the Superior Court, it may be
faster and more economical to bring the proceeding in the appropriate Superior Court.” 15A
MASS. PRAC., supra note 172, § 28:82. Furthermore, there are normal methods to remedy a
defective foreclosure, which raises the issue of why such remedies exist if it can be done by
utilizing the foreclosure by entry as an alternative foreclosure. Rather, it follows logically that
because those other methods of remedying are available, foreclosure by entry should not be
used in place of them.
245. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
246. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp. v. Wain, No. 12 MISC 459002(AHS), 2012 WL
5475849, 6 (Mass. Land Ct. Nov. 9, 2012) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 941 N.E.2d at 50).
247. U.S. Bank Nat’l. Ass’n, 941 N.E.2d at 44.
248. “Entry under foreclosure is subject to waiver, and a foreclosure by entry may be
opened by agreement.” 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009). See Botham v. McIntier, 36
Mass. 346, 346 (1837).
249. 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009); see Joyner v. Lenox Sav. Bank, 76 N.E.2d
169, 174 (Mass. 1947).
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after formal entry of the mortgagee for foreclosure “under circumstances
strongly indicating that the real relation between the parties is that
merely of debtor and creditor,” may suffice to show a waiver.250 If, after
an entry for foreclosure, the mortgagee accepts a new security for the
same debt, it constitutes a waiver of the entry.251 Conversely, the mere
receipt of rents and their subsequent application to payment of amounts
due on the mortgage debt does not establish a waiver of the entry to
foreclose if the total currently outstanding on the debt is not paid off
completely.252
In Fay v Valentine, the trial court held that a mortgagee’s entry for
the purpose of effectuating a foreclosure by entry, while she had an
action pending for recovery of possession, could not be considered as
intended for the purpose of foreclosure.253 The court noted that had the
mortgagee discontinued the suit for possession of the premises, the result
might have been otherwise.254 However, the court reasoned that for the
mortgagee to pursue the action at the cost of the mortgagor, it should be
construed to be a waiver of her right to foreclose under that entry.255
C. The Provision’s Relevancy in Light of the Recent Foreclosure Crisis
From the perspective of the mortgagor, the foreclosure by entry
provision seems as though its only purpose is to ensure that mortgagees
can foreclose on real estate.256 However, the perspective of the
mortgagee is that there should be a way for mortgage lenders to
foreclose after a period of time if the homeowner is found to be absent.
In this case, the mortgagee is able to utilize the foreclosure by entry
provision as a way of maintaining a type of administrative ease in
foreclosing on a mortgaged property when the mortgagor is nowhere to
be found.257 In such a situation where the mortgagor is absent for a long
period of time, logic indicates it is significantly more cost-effective to
foreclose by entry and continued possession rather than by power of sale
250. 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009); see Trow v. Berry, 113 Mass. 139, 147
(1873).
251. 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009); see Trow, 113 Mass. at 147.
252. Joyner, 76 N.E.2d at 174; 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES § 729 (2009).
253. Fay v. Valentine, 22 Mass. 418, 425 (1827).
254. Id. at 425.
255. Id. at 425.
256. 14C MASS. PRAC., supra note 24, § 15.127 (“A mortgagee may, and often does,
employ both of the commonly used foreclosure methods concurrently . . . [T]he mortgagee
can ensure that if there is some defect in one of the methods used, the mortgagor’s right of
redemption will be foreclosed by the . . . other method.”). There is no other reason for
instituting a foreclosure by entry in addition to a sale other than a backup to ensure the
foreclosure is effectuated.
257. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
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or by any other available method.
However, an obvious counterargument to the position that
foreclosure by entry is necessary in order for administrative ease in
foreclosing on properties with absent mortgagors is that sanitary codes
and public policy concerns regarding abandoned property now serve that
purpose.258 Essentially, the modern day enactments have replaced the
need for such a method of foreclosure.259 Therefore, it seems as though
the foreclosure by entry provision should be revised to incorporate a
requirement that it need only be utilized when the mortgagor is absent
for a specified period of time, in order to better accomplish the intended
purpose of the statute while eliminating the burden from existing
homeowners.
CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts foreclosure by entry statutory provision is vague
and overbroad. Not only does the statute lack clarity in definition and
application, but the cases that apply it are inconsistent and simply
emphasize the ambiguity present within the statute. The statute’s lack of
an actual notice requirement places an undue burden on mortgagors to
consult the registry of deeds periodically to check whether a certificate
of entry has been recorded against their property in order to determine
whether they are subject to a foreclosure. Moreover, the fact that there is
no time limit on the recording of the certificate of entry gives the
mortgagee an unfair advantage in regards to deciding when the
redemption period during which the mortgagor is able to redeem the
premises begins to run.
In addition to burdening the mortgagor, allowing for “constructive”
notice to constitute ample notice to the mortgagor is simply an
unrealistic expectation. Furthermore, the statute’s usage of an “open and
peaceable entry” and “continued possession” accomplishes nothing in
the way of clarification.260 The cases interpreting the statute fail in a
similar fashion because the line of authority seems to be inconsistent and
outdated in modern society.261 Additionally, the foreclosure by entry
258. 14B MASS. PRAC., SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW § 12.82 (4th ed. 2007); see MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127A-I (2012).
259. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
260. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 1 (2012).
261. See e.g., Holmes v. Turner’s Falls Lumber Co., 23 N.E. 305 (Mass. 1890); Fletcher
v. Cary, 103 Mass. 475 (1870); Ellis v. Drake, 90 Mass. 161, 163 (1864); Lennon v. Porter, 71
Mass. 318 (1855); Ayres v. Waite, 64 Mass. 72 (1852); Swift v. Mendell, 62 Mass. 357
(1851); Bennett v. Conant, 64 Mass. 163 (1852); Fay v. Valentine, 22 Mass. 418 (1827);
Skinner v. Brewer, 21 Mass. 468 (1827); Thayer v. Smith, 17 Mass. 429 (1821); discussion of
Walker v. Thayer supra Introduction, note 13.
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provision does not accomplish anything that sanitation codes and current
public policy concerns would not.262
The burdens that the Massachusetts foreclosure by entry provision
places on mortgagors are best understood when they are viewed
practically as illustrated by the above-mentioned example. Applying the
law as it now stands to the hypothetical first posed, Mary, the young
mother, would be without any legal remedy against the foreclosure and
would have no choice but to be subjected to an eviction proceeding,
subsequently compelling her to vacate the land.
However, if
Massachusetts had an actual notice requirement, Mary would have been
informed that the foreclosure by entry had been initiated, and she would
have realized that she lacked insurance on the mortgaged property.
Thus, the presence of an actual notice requirement would have
alerted Mary to the problem, and she would have been able to obtain the
requisite insurance and ultimately could have avoided a devastating
situation three years later.263 Furthermore, if foreclosure could only be
instituted when the mortgagor is absent for a long period of time, it
would not be allowed in Mary’s case, and therefore, a foreclosure by
power of sale which requires actual notice would have been instituted
and led to the same result as above.
Therefore, the statute should be legislatively revised and judicially
clarified in order to allow for a purer understanding of the statutory
requirements and to permit a more unified application of the doctrine.
Requiring actual notice to be given to the mortgagor would ensure
fairness to all of the parties involved in the foreclosure by entry process.
Re-implementing the thirty-day recording limitation would also be a
beneficial modification. Doing so would prevent the mortgagee from
making the entry and waiting to record the certificate for a long period of
time, which effectively conceals when the redemption period begins to
run.
Brittani K. Morgan*

262. 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 410.001-410.990.
263. That is assuming that the mortgagee did not accelerate the mortgage, or even if the
mortgage was accelerated, that the mortgagee consented to the mortgagor’s request that the
mortgage be reinstated.
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